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Abstract 
We study a homogenous good triopoly in which firms first choose their cost-reducing R&D 
investments and consider alternative merger proposals, and then compete à la Cournot in the 
ensuing industry. We identify conditions under which both horizontal mergers and non 
integration are sustained by Coalition-Proof Nash equilibria (CPNE). These conditions involve 
the effectiveness of the R&D technology, as well as the distribution of the bargaining power 
between the acquirer and the acquiree, which determine the allocation of the incremental 
profits generated by the merger. We show that whether firms follow duplicative or 
complementary research paths, sustaining a merger generally requires a sufficiently effective 
R&D technology that creates endogenous cost asymmetries and renders the merger profitable, 
and a moderate distribution of bargaining power that allows to spread the benefits of the 
merger. We examine the welfare effects of mergers and obtain clear policy guidelines. 
 
Keywords: Horizontal Mergers; Cost-Reducing Innovation; Endogenous Efficiency Gains; 
Antitrust; Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium. 
 
 
 
1 IMD, ALBA Graduate Business School at The American College of Greece, and Yale 
International Center for Finance. 
 
2 Department of Political Science, University of Crete; Institute of Applied & Computational 
Mathematics, Foundation for Research and Technology, Greece, Düsseldorf Institute for 
Competition Economics, University of Düsseldorf. 
 
3 Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
 
4 Department of Economics, University of Crete. 
                                                          
 We would like to thank Lindsay McTeague for editorial assistance, and John Geanakoplos, Patrick Rey and 
participants of research seminars at Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, the Higher School of 
Economics (Moscow), and the University of Cyprus for helpful comments and suggestions. Part of this work was 
supported by COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy 
evaluation”. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), 
grants ECO2014-55953-P and MDM2014-0431, and from the Comunidad de Madrid, grant S2015/HUM-3444. 
 
1 Introduction
In the context of the global economy, firms extensively use mergers as vehicles for growth and for
gaining competitive advantage (UNCTAD, 2000; 2007). Regarding horizontal mergers, Röller
et al. (2001) argue that their profitability as well as their opposing effects on welfare have been
important topics in recent years. Gugler et al. (2003) identify nearly 16,500 horizontal mergers
around the world (each worth over one million dollars) over the period from 1981 to 1998, that
led to profit increases and efficiency gains.
A question that arises naturally is: Where do these efficiency gains come from? Straume
(2006) argues that the most commonly indicated source of efficiency gains is the rationaliza-
tion of production, from plants with higher marginal costs to those with lower marginal costs.
Yet, the relevant literature typically assumes that the pre-integration cost asymmetries are ex-
ogenous. By contrast, this paper investigates the role of firms’ R&D investment decisions in
endogenously creating cost asymmetries and potential efficiency gains that result in profitable
horizontal mergers. In our setup, merger participants bargain over the division of the incremen-
tal profits generated by the merger. With this perspective, the paper also studies the relevant
welfare effects and proposes appropriate competition policies.
We consider a two-stage Cournot triopoly model in which ex-ante symmetric firms produce a
homogenous good. In the first stage, each firm decides its level of R&D investment, and may also
propose a merger with one of the other two firms in the industry.1 If the merger proposals of any
two firms are in accordance, then these firms merge; otherwise, all firms remain independent.
In the second stage, the firms in the industry — either two or three, depending on whether or
not there has been a merger — compete à la Cournot.
We consider that firms follow either duplicative research paths (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998)
or complementary research paths (d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). In the former case, the
integrated entity’s cost is that of the most efficient firm in the merger, and therefore the R&D
investment of the least efficient firm is wasted. In the latter case, the integrated entity’s cost is
determined by the sum of the two firms’ R&D investments.
Regarding the division of the incremental profits generated by a merger, we include an
exogenous parameter that captures the bargaining power of the acquirer relative to that of
the acquiree. This parameter determines the distribution of the incremental profits (i.e., the
difference between the integrated entity’s profits and the sum of those two firms’ profits in the
ensuing triopoly if the merger does not materialize) between the acquirer and the acquiree. Thus,
1Following Inderst and Wey (2004), our model does not allow the possibility that all three firms merge to
create a monopoly, which would be blocked by the antitrust authority.
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under duplicative research paths, the acquiree invests in R&D in order to maximize its share of
the merger’s incremental profits, which results in wasteful duplication of R&D investments. By
contrast, under complementary research paths, the R&D investments of both firms contribute
to reducing the unit production cost of the integrated entity.
We investigate conditions regarding the effectiveness of the R&D technology and the distri-
bution of the bargaining power between the acquirer and the acquiree that sustain mergers. In
our context, in which firms may ultimately act jointly, it is natural to assume that firms can
freely discuss and reach agreements for joint action. Hence, an appropriate solution concept
must take into account the possibility of deviations by coalitions of firms, as well as by individ-
ual firms. Of course, in the absence of commitment, firms’ agreements must be self-enforcing.
Therefore, we employ the notion of coalition—proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) introduced by
Bernheim et al. (1987) — see also Moreno and Wooders (1996). The notion of CPNE identifies
the “agreements” that are invulnerable to self-enforcing deviations by either individual firms
or coalitions of firms. Note that, although this is a natural solution concept for the formation
of mergers, our paper is the first to introduce it in the merger literature.
When firms follow duplicative research paths, two types of mergers must be considered:
those in which the acquirer is the most efficient firm in the merger (type 1), and those in
which the acquiree is the most efficient firm in the merger (type 2). We find that type 1
mergers can typically be sustained by a CPNE when the R&D technology is quite effective,
i.e., when reducing the unit cost requires a small amount of R&D investment,2 whereas type 2
mergers can be sustained by a CPNE even when the R&D technology is relatively ineffective.
Non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE except when both the R&D technology is quite
effective and the acquirer’s bargaining power is rather large, in which case only mergers of
either type (or both) can be sustained by a CPNE. Moreover, when the R&D technology is
quite ineffective, only non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE, whereas for intermediate
values of the effectiveness of the R&D technology and the acquirer’s bargaining power both
non-integration and mergers may be sustained by a CPNE.
When firms follow complementary research paths, an integrated entity is significantly more
efficient than the outsider firm, and thus captures a larger share of the market and realizes large
profits. In this case, a merger can be sustained by a CPNE even when the R&D technology
is ineffective and the bargaining power of the acquirer is large. In fact, there is a large region
of parameters for which only a merger can be sustained by a CPNE. Only when the R&D
technology is very ineffective, is non-integration the only outcome that can be sustained by a
2They can also be sustained by a CPNE for some less effective R&D technologies provided that the acquirer’s
bargaining power is not too high.
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CPNE.
Intuitively, sustaining a merger requires that the efficiency gains effect dominates the busi-
ness stealing effect (Stigler, 1950; Salant et al., 1983). Obviously, under duplicative research
paths the wasteful duplication of R&D efforts makes it more difficult for a merger to be sus-
tained.
Assessing the welfare effects of a horizontal merger requires determining the balance of its
two opposing effects: The deadweight loss resulting from the increased market concentration,
and the efficiency gains that may make a merger welfare-enhancing. In our analysis, the impact
of these two effects depends mainly on the effectiveness of the R&D technology. When the
R&D technology is relatively effective, the efficiency gains effect dominates the deadweight loss
effect, and mergers are welfare—enhancing. Then, the important task for antitrust authorities is
to evaluate these two effects and to approve a merger only if it improves welfare, as measured
either by total surplus or by consumer surplus.
We find that under duplicative research paths, a merger in which the technology of the
acquiree is used (type 2) involves less wasteful R&D investment, and is more likely to increase
total surplus than a merger in which the technology of the acquirer is used (type 1). Further,
a merger is more likely to increase the total surplus under complementary research paths than
under duplicative ones. Hence, when the regulator’s objective is to maximize total surplus,
merger approval rules should be relatively more stringent under duplicative than under com-
plementary research paths. Moreover, under duplicative research paths, merger approval rules
should be relatively more stringent for type 1 than for type 2 mergers.
When the regulator’s objective is to maximize the consumer surplus, there are mergers
generating efficiency gains that should not be approved.3 Our analysis reveals that a merger
leads to an increase in the consumer surplus only under complementary research paths, and
only when the R&D technology is too effective.
Market and societal incentives for a merger are often misaligned, i.e., there are cases in which
a merger can be sustained by a CPNE, yet this merger is welfare detrimental and therefore should
not be approved; or there are cases in which a welfare—enhancing merger cannot be sustained by
a CPNE. This suggests that under some circumstances policy—makers should encourage firms
— e.g., via R&D subsidization policies — toward a merger that otherwise would not materialize.
Moreover, we identify cases in which under duplicative research paths the antitrust authority
3Whinston (2007) states that the antitrust authority’s “enforcement practice in most countries (including
the U.S. and the E.U.) is closest to a consumer surplus standard.” The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Justice (2011) state that “the Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies
. . . likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential harm to consumers in the relevant market.”
The Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers of the European Union (2004) state that “the relevant
benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not be worse off as a result of the merger.”
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should approve a merger only under the remedy that the integrated entity uses the acquiree’s
technology (instead of the acquirer’s). This further advocates relatively stringent approval
criteria under duplicative research paths.4
1.1 Related literature and contribution
Our paper contributes to the following strands of the literature. First, to the literature on
endogenous horizontal mergers with efficiency gains.5 Barros (1998) formalizes endogenous
mergers through “participation constraints”, i.e., the merging firms’ profits do increase relative
to their pre-merger sum of profits, and “stability constraints”, i.e., the outsider firm cannot offer
a more profitable alternative to any merger participant . In Horn and Persson (2001), a merger
is a cooperative game of coalition formation in which merger participants can decide on any
division of the coalition’s profits. Using the core as the equilibrium concept, they compare the
feasible coalitions given that transfer payments are not allowed. In this line of research, Straume
(2006) argues that the most commonly indicated source of efficiency gains is the rationalization
of production, from plants with higher marginal costs to those with lower ones. Moreover,
the pre-merger (exogenous) marginal cost asymmetries determine the identity of the merger
participants in equilibrium.6
Contrary to this line of research, the present paper (i) demonstrates that firms strategically
choose their pre-merger technologies so as to induce endogenous cost asymmetries and potential
efficiency gains; (ii) formalizes the bargaining between the merger participants over the division
of the incremental profits generated by the merger; and (iii) considers that the antitrust author-
ity approves the merger if and only if it improves welfare, measured by either the total surplus
or the consumer surplus. In addition, the paper highlights that the merger participants’ iden-
tity results from the firms’ R&D investment and merger decisions in equilibrium. It shows that
under duplicative research paths, the integrated entity always involves the most and the least
4Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey (2016) cite evidence according to which “Remedies are increasingly applied by
antitrust agencies in the United States and the European Union to clear merger proposals which are otherwise
subject to serious anticompetitive concerns” as well as “The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the EU Merger
Regulation allow for remedial offers to address competitive concerns”.
5There is also the “exogenous mergers” literature (in the taxonomy of Banal-Estañol et al., 2008). In this
literature, there is only one candidate merger and each firm in the industry is assigned a role, either participant
or no-participant, which is exogenously fixed and cannot be changed thereafter. Moreover, the merger is realized
if and only if it increases each participant’s profits, compared with those that would be obtained in the no-merger
scenario (Salant et al., 1983; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Perry and Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990;
Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997; Lommerud et al., 2005; Davidson and Ferrett, 2007).
6For large cost asymmetries, Barros (1998) finds that the two most efficient firms merge, while in Straume
(2006) the merger occurs between either the least and the most efficient firm or the two least efficient firms.
In Matsushima et al. (2013), symmetric firms merge, but only if R&D is not too costly; otherwise, the merger
occurs between asymmetric firms. For moderate cost asymmetries, Barros (1998) and Straume (2006) find that
the merger occurs between the least and the most efficient firm.
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efficient firm. This is also true under complementary research paths, but only if the acquirer’s
bargaining power is large; otherwise, the two most efficient firms merge.
In the context of endogenous mergers, efficiency gains can also be materialized by integrat-
ing the merger participants’ complementary resources, i.e., “synergies” in the terminology of
Farrell and Shapiro (2001). Banal-Estañol et al. (2008) consider that three managers, each
controlling some non-transferable resources (such as organizational or managerial capacities),
first decide whether or not to merge and then choose their investments while anticipating a
share of the future revenues. They find that managerial conflicts within a merger may offset
possible synergies, thereby reducing the incentives to merge. Moreover, even when managers
decide to merge, the integrated entity may become less efficient than the outsider firms.7 By
contrast, in our setting, an integrated entity in a type 1 merger is always more efficient than
the outsider, whereas in a type 2 merger it is more efficient than the outsider unless the R&D
technology is too ineffective and the bargaining power of the acquirer is large enough.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on optimal merger approval rules.8 Under
exogenous pre-merger cost asymmetries and potential efficiency gains, Nocke and Whinston
(2013) consider bargaining between a predetermined acquirer and possible target firms that
will result in a bilateral merger that maximizes industry profit. They show that the minimum
increase in consumer surplus for the proposed merger to be approved is larger, the greater
the target’s pre-merger market share. In Burguet and Carminal (2015), each firm may bargain
bilaterally and simultaneously with any other firm in a triopoly, and any pair of firms may merge,
thus realizing efficiency gains that vary exogenously across pairs. In this context, bargaining
may lead to a particular merger despite the existence of alternative mergers that would generate
more profits and/or consumer surplus.
The above papers argue that the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an ap-
proval rule that is more stringent than that resulting when the welfare criterion is to maximize
consumer surplus. Nocke and Whinston (2013) show that it might be optimal to reject a merger
that increases consumer surplus in order to induce firms to propose alternative mergers that
lead to a larger increase in consumer surplus. In Burguet and Carminal (2015), the antitrust
authority announces a threshold value of marginal cost and approves a merger if and only if the
merger’s marginal cost is below this threshold. Our analysis also advocates stringent approval
rules for horizontal mergers. Yet, we argue that the approval rule should depend on whether
7 In an exogenous bilateral merger, Davidson and Ferrett (2007) consider complementarities in process R&D
investments in a homogenous Cournot oligopoly. In this framework, Atallah (2016) adds industry-wide R&D
spillovers as well as differentiated products under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
8The literature on optimal merger approval rules has its origin in Besanko and Spulber (1993), who consider
the optimal rule for an antitrust authority. The latter cannot directly observe efficiencies but can recognize that
firms know this information and decide whether to propose a merger based on their superior knowledge.
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firms follow duplicative or complementary research paths, with the rule being more stringent
in the former case. Moreover, under duplicative research paths, the merger guidelines should
allow for an approval conditional on whether the integrated entity uses the merger participant’s
technology that enhances welfare. This relates our paper to the literature on merger remedies
in oligopolies (see Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey, 2016 and the references therein). Yet, this lit-
erature typically assumes industries with fixed productive capital, in which a merger reduces
the marginal cost by combining the merging firms’ complementary assets. In this context, the
merger guidelines allow for approval conditional on the merging firms divesting critical assets
to a competitor.
Finally, there is a strand in the literature that studies firms’ incentives to invest in cost-
reducing R&D in the prospect of horizontal acquisitions. In a duopolistic industry, Stenbacka
(1991) and Wong and Tse (1997) argue that the acquirer’s pre-acquisition incentives to reveal
its cost reduction R&D investments to the acquiree depend on the degree of spillovers in the
industry and the effectiveness of the R&D technology. In the prospect of an acquisition within
a duopoly, Canoy et al. (2000) show that whether a manager over- or under-invests depends on
the distribution of bargaining power between the manager and the firm’s shareholders. Socorro
(2009) argues that under takeover threats, an acquiree may increase its cost-reducing R&D
investment in order to signal its compatibility with the acquirer. These papers sideline the
issues of bargaining between the merger participants, as well as merger control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general model where we
set up our inquiry. Section 3 introduces specific assumptions about the demand and the R&D
technology that render a tractable setting in which the primitives are reduced to two parameters:
the distribution of bargaining power between the acquirer and the acquiree and the effectiveness
of the R&D technology. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the Nash and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria of the industry under duplicative and complementary research paths respectively. In
Section 6, we derive the welfare implications of our results. We conclude in Section 7. The
Appendix contains the proofs of our results.
2 A general model
We consider a homogenous good industry. The inverse demand function for the good is P (Q),
where Q ∈ R+ is the firms’ total output. There are three firms that can produce the good with
the same constant returns to scale technology, whose marginal (and unit) cost is initially equal to
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c ∈ (0, P (0)).9 Each firm can reduce its marginal cost by investing in R&D activities. Reducing
the marginal cost by an amount x ∈ [0, c] requires an investment in R&D of C(x). To simplify
our analysis, we assume that the inverse demand P (Q) is such that whether the industry is a
duopoly or a triopoly there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium.10 For every i ∈ N := {1, 2, 3}
we denote by π
(3)
i (c1, c2, c3) firm i’s equilibrium profit in the triopoly in which firms’ marginal
costs are (c1, c2, c3) ∈ [0, c]
3. Similarly, for every i ∈ {1, 2} we denote by π
(2)
i (c1, c2) firm i’s
equilibrium profit in the duopoly in which firms’ marginal costs are (c1, c2) ∈ [0, c]
2.
Firms maximize profits with respect to three decision variables: The level of R&D invest-
ment, whether or not to merge, and the level of output. We formalize the sequence of firms’
decisions as a two-stage game with observable actions. In the first stage firms simultaneously
decide their R&D investments and whether or not to merge. In the second stage, upon observ-
ing all investment and merger decisions, firms simultaneously decide their level of output. Our
model responds to the rationale that R&D investments and mergers are long-term decisions.
We model merger decisions as follows: Each firm i proposes a merger with another firm;
the proposal identifies not only the firm with which firm i wishes to merge but also its role
in the merger as either acquirer or acquiree. Specifically, each firm i proposes a merger by
selecting a pair mi = (n, n′) ∈ N × N such that either n = i, or n′ = i, or both. A proposal
mi = (i, j) indicates firm i’s desire to merge with firm j and play the role of the acquirer in
the merger. A proposal mi = (j, i) indicates firm i’s desire to merge with firm j and play the
role of the acquiree. A proposal mi = (i, i) indicates that firm i does not wish to merge. For
i ∈ N write Mi := {(n, n′) ∈ N ×N | i ∈ {n, n′}} for the set of possible merger proposals by
firm i. Also, write M := M1 ×M2 ×M3. For every m ∈ M, if mi = mj for some i, j ∈ N,
then firms i and j merge and the outsider firm k ∈ N\{i, j} remains independent; otherwise,
i.e., when m1 = m2 = m3 = m1, all three firms remain independent. Note that in our setting
only two firms may merge, i.e., a monopoly is ruled out because it will blocked by the antitrust
authorities (Inderst and Wey, 2004).
In the spirit of the generalized Nash bargaining solution, we assume that the increment in
profits generated by a merger (i.e., the difference between the integrated entity’s profits and the
sum of profits that merger participants would have in the ensuing triopoly if the merger does not
materialize) is split between merger participants according to pre-specified shares β ∈ [1/2, 1]
and 1−β for the acquirer and the acquiree, respectively. The increment in profits generated by
a merger of firms i and j depends on the marginal cost of the integrated entity, which in turn
9Assuming that the firms’ marginal cost is less than the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for the good
P (0) rules out trivial cases.
10This assumption holds when the inverse demand is a truncated linear function as we assume below. General
conditions for the uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium are provided by, e.g., Einy et al. (2010).
7
is determined by the merger participants’ R&D investments. Let us denote by ϕ(xi, xj) the
reduction in the marginal cost of the integrated entity formed by firms i and j when their R&D
expenditures are C(xi) and C(xj), respectively. We consider two polar cases: In Section 4 we
study the case in which R&D investments are substitutes, i.e., firms follow duplicative research
paths. In Section 5 we study the case in which R&D investments are complements, i.e., firms
follow complementary research paths.
Throughout the paper, we consider only pure strategies and restrict attention to subgame
perfect equilibria. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, given firms’ merger and R&D investment
decisions, the profile of outputs forms a Cournot equilibrium for the industry. Restricting atten-
tion to subgame perfect equilibria allows for a reduced form analysis of our model as a single-
stage game Γ, to be described shortly. An equilibrium of Γ unambiguously identifies a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game defined by our model. Focusing on Γ facilitates the
study of the factors determining the firms’ R&D investments and merger decisions in a simple
and manageable way.
In the game Γ, the firms are the players and each firm i’s set of pure strategies is [0, c]×Mi.
Let (x,m) ∈ [0, c]3 ×M be a profile of strategies. If m1 = m2 = m3 = m1, then the ensuing
industry is a triopoly, and the profit of each firm i ∈ N net of its R&D cost is
Πi(x,m) = π
(3)
i (c− x1, c− x2, c− x3)−C(xi). (1)
If mi = mj , for some i, j ∈ N, then firms i and j merge and the ensuing industry is therefore
a duopoly. In this case, we denote by a(m) ∈ {i, j} the index of the firm playing the role of
the acquirer and by a(m) ∈ {i, j}\{a(m)} the index of the acquiree. The index of the firm that
remains independent, the outsider firm, is denoted by o(m) ∈ N\{i, j}.11 The net profit of the
acquirer is
Πa(m)(x,m) = π
(3)
a(m)(c− x1, c− x2, c− x3) + β∆(x,m)−C(xa(m)), (2)
and that of the acquiree is
Πa(m)(x,m) = π
(3)
a(m)(c− x1, c− x2, c− x3) + (1− β)∆(x,m)−C(xa(m)), (3)
11For example, if m1 = m3 = (3, 1), then a(m) = 3, a(m) = 1, and o(m) = 2.
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where ∆(x,m) is the increment in profits generated by the merger
∆(x,m) = π
(2)
1 (c−ϕ(xa(m), xa(m)), c−xo(m))−π
(3)
a(m)
(c−x1, c−x2, c−x3)−π
(3)
a(m)
(c−x1, c−x2, c−x3).
(4)
The net profit of the outsider is
Πo(m)(x,m) = π
(2)
2 (c− ϕ(xa(m), xa(m)), c− xo(m))−C(xo(m)). (5)
Note that the net profit of each merger participant consists of three terms: The first term is
the firm’s outside option, i.e., its profits in the Cournot equilibrium of the triopoly where firms’
costs are c−xi for i ∈ N , which would result if either firm a(m) or firm a(m) breaks the merger
unilaterally. The second term is the firm’s share of the increment in profits generated by the
merger, ∆(x,m), which is the difference between the integrated entity’s profits in the duopoly
and the sum of the profits of firms a(m) and a(m) in the triopoly. The third term is the firm’s
R&D cost.
It is easy to construct a Nash equilibrium (NE) of Γ in which firms do not merge, which we
refer to as non-integration. For example, the profile (x,m) given for all i ∈ N bymi = (i, i), and
xi = xNI where xNI maximizes π
(3)
1 (c−x, c−x
NI , c−xNI)−C(x), is a NE. Simply note that no
firm can generate a merger by unilaterally deviating, and each firm’s level of R&D investment
maximizes its net profits given the investments of the rival firms. For future references, we state
this simple result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Non-integration can always be sustained by a Nash equilibrium.
In our context, it is natural to assume that firms are free to discuss their strategies and reach
agreements for joint action. Obviously, in the absence of commitment firms’ agreements must
be self-enforcing. We therefore employ coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), introduced
by Bernheim et al. (1987), as the solution concept. A CPNE identifies the agreements that
are invulnerable to self-enforcing deviations by either individual firms or coalitions of firms. A
deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation available
to a proper subcoalition of firms. This notion of self-enforceability provides a useful means of
distinguishing coalitional deviations that are viable from those that are not resistant to further
deviations. Of course, a CPNE is also a NE. However, not all NE are CPNE, and the existence
of a CPNE is not warranted under standard conditions — see Moreno and Wooders (1996) for
a limited existence result. Moreover, identifying the CPNE of a game may be a difficult task,
as it requires checking its robustness against all possible self-enforcing deviations. However,
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the concept has proved to be useful in studying models of competition that lead to a large
set of equilibria — see e.g., Delgado and Moreno (2004). Our model is simple enough that,
notwithstanding these difficulties, we are able to identify the regions of parameters in which
there are CPNE that sustain various types of mergers as well as non-integration.
The notion of CPNE is defined recursively on the number of players: In a single player game
a strategy profile s∗ is a CPNE if it maximizes the player’s payoff. Consider a game with n > 1
players, and assume that the notion of CPNE has been defined for games with k < n players.
In this game, (i) a strategy profile s is self-enforcing if for every proper subcoalition J ⊂ N
the strategy profile sJ is a CPNE of the game obtained from the original game by fixing the
strategy of every player outside the coalition i ∈ N\{J} as si; (ii) A CPNE of the game is a
strategy profile s∗ that is self-enforcing and such that no other self-enforcing strategy profile
exists that yields a greater payoff for every player.
3 A simple model
Henceforth we consider a simple version of our model in which the inverse demand function for
the good is P (Q) = max{α−Q, 0} and the R&D cost function is C(x) = γx2/2. The parameter
γ > 0 is a proxy for the effectiveness of the R&D technology in reducing the marginal cost:
The greater γ, the greater the expenditure required to obtain a given reduction in the marginal
cost, i.e., the less effective the R&D technology. This quadratic specification of the R&D cost
implies diminishing returns to R&D expenditures — see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). To
guarantee that equilibrium is interior we assume in the sequel that γ ≥ 3/2.
Consider the subgame of Cournot competition following merger proposalsm ∈M and firms’
R&D investments x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ [0, c]
3. Because in this subgame R&D investments are sunk,
in equilibrium each firm i chooses its output to maximize its profit. In a subgame involving
no merger, the profit of firm i ∈ N in the linear triopoly in which firms’ marginal costs are
(c− x1, c− x2, c− x3) is
π
(3)
i (c− x1, c− x2, c− x3) =

α− c+ 4xi −X
4
2
, (6)
where X = x1 + x2 + x3 is the firms’ total R&D investment. Consider a subgame involving
a merger. Henceforth we write (a, a, o) for (a(m), a(m), o(m)). The marginal cost of the
integrated entity is c− ϕ(xa, xa) and that of the outsider is c− xo. In this linear duopoly the
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profit of the integrated entity is
π
(2)
1 (c− ϕ(xa, xa), c− xo) =

α− c+ 2ϕ(xa, xa)− xo
3
2
, (7)
and that of the outsider is
π
(2)
2 (c− ϕ(xa, xa), c− xo) =

α− c+ 2xo − ϕ(xa, xa)
3
2
. (8)
In this setting, it is easy to calculate the firms’ cost reduction implied by their level of
R&D investment in a NE that sustains non-integration: In such an equilibrium of Γ, the R&D
investment level of each firm i ∈ N maximizes net profits
Π
(3)
i (x¯−i, xi) =

α− c+ 3xi − x¯−i
4
2
−
1
2
γx2i , (9)
where x¯−i = X − xi. Hence, firm i’s R&D reaction function is
R
(3)
i (x¯−i) =
3(α− c− x¯−i)
8γ − 9
. (10)
Solving the system of reaction functions, we obtain the level of R&D investment of each
firm xNI in a NE of Γ that sustains non-integration. Then replacing the firms’ levels of R&D
investments in (9), we obtain the net profit of each firm ΠNI . Formulae describing these
values are provided in Appendix A.1. These formulae reveal that the equilibrium level of R&D
investment and output increases and net profit decrease, the more effective the R&D technology
(i.e., the smaller the value of γ). It should be noted that for any (γ, β), there is a unique Nash
equilibrium that sustains non-integration.
Let x ∈ [0, c]3 and assume that there is a merger. As the marginal costs of the integrated
entity and the outsider are c− ϕ(xa, xa) and c− xo, respectively, the net profit of the outsider
is
Πo(x,m) =

α− c+ 2xo − ϕ(xa, xa)
3
2
−
γ
2
x2o, (11)
the net profit of the acquirer a is
Πa(x,m) =

α− c+ 4xa −X
4
2
+ β∆(x,m)−
γ
2
x2a, (12)
and the net profit of the acquiree a is
Πa(x,m) =

α− c+ 4xa −X
4
2
+ (1− β)∆(x,m)−
γ
2
x2a, (13)
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where ∆(x,m) is the increment in profits generated by the merger,
∆(x,m) =

α− c+ 2ϕ(xa, xa)− xo
3
2
(14)
−

α− c+ 4xa −X
4
2
+

α− c+ 4xa −X
4
2
.
Calculating the firms’ reaction functions in R&D investment levels when there is a merger,
and verifying whether a profile can be sustained by a CPNE of Γ, is more involved and requires
specifying the function ϕ, which describes the technological consequences of the merger. In the
next two sections we study in turn the cases of duplicative and complementary research paths.
4 Duplicative research paths
In this section we assume that firms’ R&D investments are perfectly substitutable, i.e., as in
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), firms follow duplicative research paths. If two firms i and j merge,
then the integrated entity produces its output at a marginal cost equal to the minimum of the
marginal costs of both firms, i.e.,
ϕ(xi, xj) = max{xi, xj}.
In this scenario, following a merger, the reaction function of the outsider is
Ro(xa, xa) =
4

α− c−max{xa, xa}

9γ − 8
. (15)
The reaction functions of the acquirer and the acquiree are
Ra(xa, xo) =
(27 + 14β) (α− c− xo) + 27(2β − 1)xa
72γ + 26β − 81
(16)
and
Ra(xa, xo) =
(1 + 2β)(α− c− xo)− 3(2β − 1)xa
8γ − 10β + 1
, (17)
if xa > xa (i.e., the acquirer is the most efficient firm in the merger), and they are
Ra(xa, xo) =
(3− 2β) (α− c− xo) + 3(2β − 1)xa
8γ + 10β − 9
, (18)
and
Ra(xa, xo) =
(41− 14β) (α− c− xo)− 27 (2β − 1)xa
72γ − 26β − 55
, (19)
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if xa < xa (i.e., the acquirer is the least efficient firm in the merger).
Independent of the relative efficiency of the acquirer and the acquiree, the strategic relation-
ship between the R&D investments of the three firms provides the following insights. First, the
R&D investment of the least efficient firm in the merger does not affect the R&D investment of
the outsider. Second, the R&D investment of the acquirer increases with the R&D investment
of the acquiree: As the acquiree’s R&D increases, its reservation profit (i.e., its profit in the
Cournot triopoly, π
(3)
a ) increases, which provides incentives for the acquirer to increase its own
R&D investment in order to mitigate this effect. Third, the R&D investment of the acquiree
decreases with the R&D investment of the acquirer: An increase in the acquirer’s R&D invest-
ment leads to an increase in its reservation profit (i.e., its profits in the Cournot triopoly, π
(3)
a )
and a decrease in the acquiree’s reservation profit π
(3)
a and might also increase the profit of the
integrated entity in the duopoly π
(2)
1 ; as the R&D investments of the acquirer and the acquiree
are strategic substitutes in the triopoly, the acquiree’s incentive to invest in R&D decreases.
Finally, the R&D investments of both firms in a merger are strategic substitutes for the R&D
investment of the outsider.
A solution to the system of equations formed by the firms’ reaction functions (15) to (19)
provides the firms’ R&D investments x = (xa, xa, xo) in a Nash equilibrium that sustains a
merger (see Appendix A.2 for the solution to this system). In contrast to non-integration,
which can be sustained by a NE for all parameter values, mergers of either type 1 (xa > xa)
or type 2 (xa < xa) can be sustained by a NE only on a subset of the parameter space.
This is because mergers are vulnerable to unilateral deviations of either the acquirer or the
acquiree. (These deviations involve breaking the merger and optimally adjusting the level of
R&D investments to compete in a triopoly.) It turns out that for any given distribution of
bargaining power between the acquirer and the acquiree (i.e., the value of β), when the R&D
technology is sufficiently effective (i.e., for γ low enough), there are NE that sustain both types
of mergers. The parameter constellations for which a type 1 and a type 2 merger are sustained
as a NE are illustrated in Figure 1. The black and red lines indicate the upper bound for the
parameter γ such that a type 1 and a type 2 merger, respectively, can be sustained by a NE.
Note that, although for most parameters the two types of merger can be sustained by a NE,
there are parameter constellations in which only one type of merger can be sustained by a NE.
Proposition 2 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 2. Consider an industry in which firms follow duplicative research paths.
(2.1) A type 1 (i.e., xa > xa) merger can be sustained by a NE if and only if γ ≤ γ¯12(β) ≡
min[γ¯1(β), γ¯2(β)].
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(2.2) A type 2 (i.e., x′a < x
′
a) merger can be sustained by a NE if and only if γ ≤ γ1(β).
Figure 1 provides a graph of the functions involved in Proposition 2. Recall that according
to Proposition 1, non-integration can always be sustained by a NE.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Given the firms’ R&D investments in a NE that sustains a merger, we can calculate the
firms’ outputs q = (qm, qo), where qm is the output of the integrated entity and qo is the output
of the outsider. Likewise, we can calculate the firms’ net profits Π = (Πa,Πa,Πo). Formulae
describing these values are given in Appendix A.2. These formulae reveal a number of properties
of the outcomes generated by NE that sustain a type 1 and a type 2 merger, which we summarize
in Proposition 3. Recall that ΠNI is the profit of a firm in a NE that sustains non-integration.
Proposition 3. Consider an industry in which firms follow duplicative research paths and let
(x, q,Π) and (x′, q′,Π′) be the firms’ R&D investments, outputs and net profits in a NE that
sustains a type 1 (i.e., xa > xa) and a type 2 (i.e., x′a < x
′
a) merger, respectively.
(3.1) xa > xo > xa > 0, min[x
′
o, x
′
a] > x
′
a > 0; moreover, x
′
a > x
′
o except if both γ and β are
large.
(3.2) qm > qo; moreover, q
′
m > q
′
o except if both γ and β are large.
(3.3) xa > x′a, xo < x
′
o, xa + xo > x
′
a + x
′
o; moreover, xa > x
′
a except if γ is small.
(3.4) qm > q
′
m, qo < q
′
o, and qm + qo > q
′
m + q
′
o.
(3.5) Π′o > Πo > Π
NI; moreover, Πo +Πa +Πa < Π
′
o +Π
′
a +Π
′
a except if γ is small.
(3.6) Πa > ΠNI > Πa, Π′a > Π
NI > Π′a; hence Πa > Π
′
a, and Π
′
a > Πa.
(3.7) Πo > Πa except if γ is small; moreover Π′o > Π
′
a except if both γ and β are small.
In a NE that sustains a merger:
(3.1) The outsider’s R&D investment is larger than that of the least efficient firm in the
integrated entity; moreover, in a type 1 merger (i.e., xa > xa), the integrated entity is more
efficient than the outsider (i.e., xa > xo), but in a type 2 merger (i.e., x
′
a < x
′
a) the most efficient
firm may either the integrated entity or the outsider. In fact, x′a > x
′
o except if both β and γ
are high enough.
(3.2) The output of the integrated entity is always larger than that of the outsider in a type
1 merger. This is also true for a type 2 merger, except if the bargaining power of the acquirer
is large and the technology is not too effective.
In addition, relative to a type 2 merger, in a type 1 merger
14
(3.3) The integrated entity is more efficient, the outsider is less efficient, and the industry’s
total effective R&D investments, i.e., the investments actually used to reduce firms’ marginal
costs, are larger; further, the wasteful R&D investments are larger, except if the technology is
too effective.
(3.4) The output of the integrated entity and the total output are larger, whereas the output
of the outsider is smaller.
(3.5) The profit of the outsider and the total profit (except for very low γ) is smaller;
further, in any merger equilibrium the outsider obtains higher profits than in a non-integration
equilibrium.
Moreover, in a type 1 (2) merger
(3.6) The profits of the acquirer (acquiree) are larger than in the non-integration equilibrium,
whereas the profits of the acquiree (acquirer) are smaller than in the non-integration equilibrium.
(3.7) The profits of the outsider are larger than those of the acquirer (acquiree), except if γ
is low enough (if both β and γ are low enough.)
We turn now to identifying the CPNEs. Let us consider the non-integration Nash equilibrium
profile where xi = x
NI and mi = (i, i) identified in Section 2. In order for this NE to be a
CPNE of the game, it must be invulnerable to all self-enforcing coalitional deviations. The
relevant deviations are those involving any two firms merging and choosing appropriately their
R&D investments, taking as given the R&D investment of the outsider xo = x
NI . Of course,
each deviation must be profitable and self-enforcing, i.e., robust against further deviations by
each firm in the merger.
Consider next a candidate CPNE involving a merger. Proposition 1 identifies the parameter
constellations in which there is a NE that sustains a merger. For this NE to be a CPNE,
however, we must account for the possibility of coalitional deviations involving the acquirer
a (or the acquiree a) and the outsider o, in which the former breaks the merger and forms a
new merger with the outsider and in which both firms optimally adjust their R&D investments
(taking as given the R&D investments of the outsider firm in the new merger). In addition,
we must account for a coalitional deviation of the firms in a type 1 (or 2) merger in which
they adjust their R&D investments appropriately (taking as given the R&D investments of
the outsider) and form a type 2 (or 1) merger. Of course, in order for such deviations to be
self-enforcing, they must be invulnerable to further unilateral deviations by either firm in the
deviating coalition. The non-profitability of each of the above deviations places a restriction on
the parameter values. Checking these restrictions and identifying the parameter constellations
for which a solution to the system of the firms’ reaction functions and inequalities is a CPNE
of the game involves simple but messy algebra, which we relegate to Appendix A.2.
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Proposition 4 provides a description of the parameter constellations in which non-integration
and mergers of type 1 and 2 can be sustained by a CPNE. The description involves the following
subsets of the relevant parameter space Ω = {(β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [3/2,∞)}:
Bd = {(β, γ) | γ ≥ γ(β)}
Rd = {(β, γ) | γ¯9(β) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯12(β)} ∪ {(β, γ) | γ¯3(β) ≤ γ ≤ γ¯7(β)} ∪ {(β, γ) | γ ≤ γ¯4(β)}
Y d = {(β, γ) | γ ≤ γ
1
(β)}\{(β, γ) | γ
4
(β) ≤ γ ≤ γ
3
(β)}
W d = Ω\(Bd ∪Rd ∪ Y d).
Proposition 4. Consider an industry in which firms follow duplicative research paths.
(4.1) Non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE only if (β, γ) ∈ Bd.
(4.2) A type 1 merger can be sustained by a CPNE only if (β, γ) ∈ Rd.
(4.3) A type 2 merger can be sustained by a CPNE only if (β, γ) ∈ Y d.
(4.4) If (β, γ) ∈W d, then a CPNE does not exist.
The sets Bd, Rd and Y d correspond to the areas in blue, red and yellow in Figures 2a, 2b
and 2c, respectively. The boundaries of these sets are identified by the “incentive constraints”
required to sustain each type of outcome as a CPNE. Appendix A.2, which contains the proof
of Proposition 4, provides the functions involved in the definitions of these sets.
INSERT FIGURES 2a, 2b AND 2c HERE
Figure 3 provides a partition of the parameter space that allows us to identify the outcomes
that can be sustained by a CPNE for each parameter value: The blue (respectively, red, yellow)
area represents the set Bd∩(Ω\(Rd∪Y d)) (respectively, Rd∩ (Ω\(Bd∪Y d)) and Y d∩(Ω\(Bd∪
Rd))) in which only non-integration (respectively, a type 1 merger, a type 2 merger) can be
sustained by a CPNE. The purple area represents the set Bd ∩ Rd ∩ (Ω\Y d) in which both
non-integration and a type 1 merger can be sustained, but a type 2 merger cannot be sustained,
by a CPNE. Likewise, the green area represents the set Bd ∩ Y d ∩ (Ω\Rd) in which both non-
integration and a type 2 merger can be sustained, but a type 1 merger cannot be sustained, by a
CPNE. The orange area represents the set Rd∩Y d∩(Ω\Bd) in which both types of mergers can
be sustained, but non-integration cannot be sustained, by a CPNE. The grey area represents
the set Bd ∩ Rd ∩ Y d in which all three outcomes can be sustained by a CPNE. Finally, the
small white area represents the set W d in which no CPNE exists.
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INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
In contrast to Salant et al. (1983), that in a symmetric linear Cournot triopoly with ho-
mogenous products only integration to a monopoly is profitable, Proposition 4 establishes that
R&D investments may endogenously generate the asymmetries needed to sustain a merger by
two firms. Further, in contrast to Barros (1998) and Straume (2006) in which exogenously
given cost asymmetries determine the participants in a merger, in our setup cost asymmetries
arise endogenously and determine the merger participants. In particular, and in contrast to the
aforementioned literature, we find that the merger is always formed between the most and the
least efficient firms. Moreover, in a type 1(2) merger, the most efficient firm is the acquirer
(acquiree). In this respect, not only the identity of the firms in the merger, but also whose
technology is used by the integrated entity, is determined endogenously in our setup.
The profitability of a merger is limited by, first, the business stealing effect (Stigler, 1950;
Salant et al., 1983), i.e., the increased sales of the outsider firm caused by the merger, and second,
the wasteful duplication of R&D investments by the firms in the merger. A merger is profitable
when the impact on profits of the efficiency gains and the increased market power generated by
the merger are large enough to outweigh the business stealing and wasteful duplication effects.
Type 1 mergers can be sustained by a CPNE for the parameter constellations in the red
area shown in Figure 2b. This is a subspace of the parameters in which type 1 mergers can
be sustained by a NE (Proposition 1.1). This is because these mergers may be vulnerable to
coalitional deviations whereby firms in the merger switch their roles and adjust their levels of
R&D investments to those of a type 2 merger. The latter deviations are profitable when the
R&D technology is ineffective (i.e., γ is large). Yet, the upper bound on γ depends in turn on the
vulnerability of these coalitional deviations to further unilateral deviations. As a consequence,
type 1 mergers can be sustained in the upper red area in Figure 2b. In addition, for given β, a
deviation of the coalition of the outsider and the acquirer, which form a new integrated entity
in which the latter has the role of the acquiree and choose the R&D investment levels of a type
2 merger, may also upset the merger when the R&D technology is sufficiently effective (i.e.,
γ is low). The latter deviation is profitable for both firms (and also invulnerable to further
unilateral deviations by each one of them) in the white area of Figure 2b. Thus, type 1 mergers
cannot be sustained by a CPNE in that area. (See the proof of Proposition 4.2 in Appendix
A.2.)
Likewise, type 2 mergers can be sustained by a CPNE for the parameter constellations in
the yellow area shown in Figure 2c. Again, this is a subspace of the parameters in which type
2 mergers can be sustained by a NE (Proposition 1.2). This is because these mergers may be
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vulnerable to a coalitional deviation of the acquiree and the outsider, which form an integrated
entity in which the latter has the role of the acquiree and adjust their R&D investment levels
appropriately. This deviation is profitable for both firms, and also invulnerable to further
unilateral deviations when the R&D technology is sufficiently effective (i.e., γ is low) and the
acquirer’s bargaining power is high (i.e., β is high). Thus, type 2 mergers cannot be sustained by
a CPNE in the white area of Figure 2c. Moreover, as Figure 3 illustrates, type 2 mergers can be
sustained by a CPNE in a wider range of parameters (i.e., for less effective R&D technologies)
than type 1 mergers.
Non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE for all parameter constellations except for
those in the white area of Figure 2a. In particular, if R&D technology is effective (i.e., γ is low)
and the bargaining power of the acquirer is high (i.e., β is high), a deviation of a coalition of any
two firms that form a type 2 merger and adjust their levels of R&D investments appropriately
upsets non-integration. This deviation leads to a merger in which the acquiree invests more
in R&D than the acquirer in order to overcome the acquirer’s large bargaining power. In fact,
after the deviation the profits of the acquirer are lower than those of the acquiree, although the
profits of both firms are sufficiently large to make the deviation profitable. Clearly, the latter
deviation is self-enforcing because neither of the deviating firms can do better by switching back
to non-integration.
Finally, for the parameter constellations in the white area of Figure 3 a CPNE does not
exist. This region is the intersection of the white areas in Figures 2a, 2b and 2c. As we saw
above, for (β, γ) ∈W d, non-integration cannot be sustained by a CPNE as it is vulnerable to a
deviation by a coalition of any two firms that form a type 2 merger. In addition, neither type of
merger can be sustained by a CPNE in this region: a type 1 merger is vulnerable to a deviation
of the coalition of the outsider and the acquirer (using the technology of the latter) and a type
2 merger is vulnerable to a deviation of the coalition of the acquiree and the outsider (using the
technology of the former).
5 Complementary research paths
In this section we assume that firms’ R&D investments are perfectly complementary; i.e., as in
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume that firms follow complementary research paths.
If two firms i and j merge and invest in R&D xi and xj , respectively, then the integrated entity
reduces its marginal cost by an amount equal to
ϕ(xi, xj) = xi + xj .
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In this scenario, following a merger, the firms’ reaction functions are
Rˆa¯(xo, xa) =
(27 + 14β)(α− c− xo) + (118β − 27)xa
72γ + 26β − 81
, (20)
Rˆa(xo, xa) =
(41− 14β)(α− c− xo)− (118β − 91)xa
72γ − 26β − 55
(21)
Rˆo(xa, xa) =
4(α− c− xa − xa)
9γ − 8
(22)
Naturally, the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D investments differs from those
of the case of duplicative research paths. With complementary research paths, the outsider’s
R&D investment and the R&D investments of the acquirer and the acquiree that are jointly
used by the integrated entity, are strategic substitutes. In addition, the incentive of the acquirer
to increase its R&D investment as the acquiree invests more is even sharper than in the case of
duplicative research paths. By contrast, the acquiree has an incentive to invest more in R&D
the more the acquirer invests, but only if the bargaining power of the acquirer is not too large
— specifically, if β < 91/118 ≃ 0.77.
A solution to the system of equations formed by the firms’ reaction functions (20) to (22)
provides the firms’ R&D investments x = (xa, xa, xo) in the unique NE that sustains a merger. In
this scenario, second order and stability conditions require γ ≥ 5/2, which we assume throughout
this section. When this inequality holds, the system of equations has a unique solution, i.e.,
the market outcome resulting from a merger sustained by a NE is uniquely determined. As
above, and in contrast to non-integration which is sustained by a NE for all parameter values
(Proposition 1), a merger is sustained by a NE only on a subset of the parameter space. More
specifically, a merger is vulnerable to a deviation of the acquirer (breaking the merger and
adjusting its R&D investment appropriately) when the R&D technology is sufficiently effective
given β, i.e., γ ≤ γc1(β) (see Figure 4). Interestingly, when the acquirer has no incentive to
deviate, neither does the acquiree. Thus, the inequality above identifies the subset of parameters
in which a merger can be sustained by a NE. This finding is stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: In an industry in which firms follow complementary research paths a merger
can be sustained by a NE if and only if γ ≤ γc1(β).
The equilibrium R&D investments determine firms’ equilibrium outputs q = (qm, qo) and net
profits Π = (Πa,Πa,Πo). Formulae describing the equilibrium outcome are given in Appendix
A.3. These formulae reveal a number of properties that we summarize in Proposition 6.
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Proposition 6. Consider an industry in which firms follow complementary research paths.
In a NE that sustains a merger, (x, q,Π), firms’ R&D investments, outputs and net profits are
uniquely determined and satisfy:
(6.1) xa > xa, xa > xo; hence, xa + xa > xo > 0.
(6.2) qm > qo.
(6.3) Πa > Πa; moreover, Πa > Πo if γ is small.
(6.4) Πo > Π
NI and ΠNI > Πa except if γ is small ; moreover, Πa > Π
NI if both γ and β are
small.
In a NE that sustains a merger:
(6.1) The acquirer’s R&D investment level is greater than both the acquiree’s and the
outsider’s. As a result, the integrated entity is significantly more efficient than the outsider.
(6.2) A consequence of the above is that the output of the integrated entity is greater than
that of the outsider.
(6.3) The profits of the acquirer are higher than those of the acquiree. This is because the
acquirer is more powerful than the acquiree. Moreover, the acquirer’s profits are higher than
the outsider’s but only if the technology is sufficiently effective. This may also hold for the
acquiree’s profits but for even lower values of γ (for γ close to 5/2).
(6.4) The profits of the outsider are higher than in the non-integration equilibrium except
if the technology is too effective (for values of γ close to 5/2). By contrast, the profits of the
acquirer and the acquiree are higher than in the non-integration equilibrium, but only if the
technology is sufficiently effective. Therefore, firms have conflicting interests regarding their
preferable equilibrium.
We next turn to identifying the parameter constellations for which either non-integration or
a merger can be sustained by a CPNE. As before, we consider the non-integration NE profile
where xi = x
NI and mi = (i, i) identified in Section 3. In order for this NE to be a CPNE of the
game, it must be invulnerable to all self-enforcing coalitional deviations. Again, it is sufficient to
consider a deviation of any two firms that adjust their R&D investments appropriately, taking
as given that the outsider R&D investment level is xNI . Note that when two firms decide to
jointly deviate and merge, the integrated entity enjoys efficiency gains simply because the two
firms put together their R&D efforts. This implies that deviation incentives are stronger when
research paths are complementary than when they are duplicative. Of course, these deviations
should be invulnerable to further unilateral deviations of each of the firms forming the coalition.
As for CPNE involving a merger, we restrict our attention to mergers that are sustained by
a NE (Proposition 4). We then consider coalitional deviations involving either the acquirer a
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(or acquiree a) breaking the merger and forming a new integrated entity with the outsider firm
o as either the acquirer or the acquiree. (Note that a deviation of the coalition formed by firms
a and a switching their roles cannot be profitable.)
Proposition 7 provides a description of the parameter constellations in which non-integration
and mergers can be sustained by a CPNE. The description involves identifying several subsets
of the relevant parameter space Ωˆ = {(β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [5/2,∞)}:
Bc = {(β, γ) | γ ≥ γc1(β)} ∩ {(β, γ) | γ
c
2(β) ≤ γ ≤ γ
c
3(β)}
Gc = {(β, γ) | γc2(β) ≤ γ ≤ γ
c
1(β)}
W c = {(β, γ) | γc4(β) < γ < min[γ
c
2(β), γ
c
3(β)]}
Y c = {(β, γ) | γ ≤ γc2(β)}\W
c.
Figure 4 describes these sets, and Appendix A.3, which contains the proof of Proposition 7,
provides the functions involved in the definitions.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Proposition 7. Consider an industry in which firms follow complementary research paths.
(7.1) Non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE only if (β, γ) ∈ Bc ∪Gc.
(7.2) A merger can be sustained by a CPNE only if (β, γ) ∈ Y c ∪Gc.
(7.3) If (β, γ) ∈W c, then a CPNE does not exist.
A merger is sustained by a CPNE when the R&D technology is sufficiently effective — except
in the regionsW c (white area in Figure 4), in which a CPNE does not exist, and lower Bc (blue
area close to the horizontal axis), in which only non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE.
The latter is also true when the R&D technology is very ineffective (upper Bc area in blue).
Unlike duplicative research paths, complementary research paths have no wasteful duplication
of R&D investments. In addition, the fact that the merger participants combine their R&D
investments intensifies the rationalization of production and strengthens the profitability of a
merger. Yet, if the R&D technology is very ineffective, a merger cannot be sustained even by
a NE because, as we saw above, the acquirer has unilateral incentives to deviate. Regarding
coalitional deviations, a deviation by the acquiree and the outsider, which form a coalition in
which they assume the roles of acquirer and acquiree respectively, and adjust their investments
optimally, may upset a merger for intermediate values of the acquirer’s bargaining power when
the R&D technology is too effective. Further, this deviation is profitable and invulnerable to
further unilateral deviations in the W c and lower Bc areas of Figure 4.
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Non-integration can be sustained by a CPNE for the parameter values in the blue and green
areas in Figure 4. If the R&D technology is sufficiently effective given the acquirer’s bargaining
power, a coalitional deviation of any two firms that form an integrated entity and adjust their
R&D investments appropriately is a profitable self-enforcing deviation.
Finally, for the parameter constellations in the white W c region, a CPNE does not exist:
Non-integration cannot be sustained by a CPNE, as it is vulnerable to a deviation by a coalition
of any two firms that form a merger, and a merger cannot be sustained by a CPNE because it
is vulnerable to a deviation of the coalition formed by the acquiree and the outsider.
Note that in the green Gc region in Figure 4, both a merger and non-integration can be
sustained by a CPNE. As in the case of duplicative research paths, under complementary
research paths too the outcomes generated by a merger and by non-integration cannot be Pareto
ranked (see Proposition 6). Yet, a merger can be sustained by a CPNE in a much broader set of
parameter constellations under complementary research paths than under duplicative research
paths (see Figures 3 and 4). Also, unlike duplicative research paths, with complementary
research paths, a merger may involve the two most efficient firms in the industry when the
acquirer’s bargaining power is not too large. (When the acquirer’s bargaining power is large a
merger involves the most and the least efficient firms in the industry.)
6 Welfare analysis
In this section we examine the impact of mergers on the total surplus (i.e., the sum of con-
sumer surplus and firms’ profits). For (β, γ) denote by SNI(β, γ) the total surplus under
non-integration, by S¯d(β, γ) and Sd(β, γ) the total surplus in a type 1 and a type 2 merger,
respectively, when firms follow duplicative research paths, and by Sc(β, γ) the total surplus in a
merger when firms follow complementary research paths. Proposition 8 summarizes our findings
(see Appendix A.4 for its proof).
Proposition 8.
(8.1) If firms follow duplicative research paths, then S¯d(β, γ)  SNI(β, γ) iff γ ⋚ γ¯dw (β), and
Sd(β, γ)  SNI(β, γ) iff γ  γd
w
(β), where γ¯dw (β) < γ
d
w
(β). Thus, when a type 1 merger leads
to a total surplus increase so does a type 2 merger, but not vice versa.
(8.2) If firms follow complementary research paths, then Sc(β, γ)  SNI(β, γ) iff γ  γcw (β) .
(8.3) If a merger leads to a total surplus increase under duplicative research paths, so does a
merger under complementary research paths, but not vice versa (i.e., γcw (β) < γ
d
w
(β)).
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The traditional approach for reviewing horizontal mergers stresses the trade-off (articulated
by Williamson, 1968) between the deadweight loss resulting from the increased market concen-
tration, which tends to reduce total surplus, and the efficiency gains arising from a larger and
more effective use of the R&D investments, which tends to increase total surplus. Under both
duplicative and complementary research paths, the (positive) efficiency gains effect dominates
the (negative) deadweight loss effect when the R&D technology is sufficiently effective, i.e., γ
is sufficiently low given the acquirer’s bargaining power (see Figures 3 and 4). Interestingly,
under duplicative research paths, a merger in which the technology of the acquiree is used (type
2 merger) is more likely to be welfare-enhancing than a merger in which the technology of the
acquirer is used (type 1 merger) — see Figure 3. The main reason for this result is that a type 2
merger leads to a lower level of wasteful R&D expenditures than a type 1 merger (Proposition
3.3). Further, a merger is more likely to increase total surplus under complementary than under
duplicative research paths. This is because efficiency gains are larger when both firms’ R&D
efforts contribute to reducing the integrated entity’s marginal cost.
Following the seminal analyses of Williamson (1968) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990), let us
assume that the objective of the antitrust authority is to maximize total surplus. Then the policy
implications of Proposition 8 are clear: The criteria for approval should be more stringent under
duplicative than under complementary research paths. Moreover, under duplicative research
paths the criteria for approval should be more stringent for type 1 than for type 2 mergers.
Market and societal incentives for a merger are often misaligned. There are cases in which a
merger can be sustained by a CPNE whereas non-integration cannot, yet the merger decreases
total surplus, and therefore should not be approved. Under complementary research paths, this
occurs when the R&D technology is ineffective and the acquirer’s bargaining power is small —
see region Y c for γ > γcw (β) in Figure 4. Under duplicative research paths, this occurs for type
1 mergers when the R&D technology is relatively ineffective and the acquirer’s bargaining power
is sufficiently high — see orange region for γ > γ¯dw (β) in Figure 3. In addition, there are cases
in which, besides non-integration, a merger that decreases total surplus can be sustained by a
CPNE. Under duplicative research paths, this occurs for type 1 mergers in the purple region
for γ > γ¯dw (β) and for type 2 mergers in the green region for γ > γ
d
w
(β) — see Figure 3. Under
complementary research paths, this occurs in the region Gc for γ > γcw (β) (Figure 4).
There are also cases in which a merger increases total surplus, but it cannot be sustained
by a CPNE. This occurs in regions Bc and W c for γ < γcw (β) under complementary research
paths (see Figure 4), and in the white region of Figure 3 under duplicative research paths.
In addition, there are cases in which a merger increases total surplus even though firms may
end up non-integrating in a CPNE. For instance, this occurs in region Gc for γ < γcw (β) under
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complementary research paths (Figure 4). These findings suggest that under some circumstances
policy-makers should encourage firms, e.g., via R&D subsidization policies, toward a merger that
otherwise would not materialize.
Interestingly, a more subtle issue arises in our setup: For some parameter values both type 1
and type 2 mergers can be sustained by a CPNE, with a type 2 merger increasing total surplus
and a type 1 merger decreasing it. Specifically, this occurs in the orange region of Figure 3 for
γdw (β) < γ < γ
d
w
(β). In such cases, the antitrust authority should evaluate horizontal mergers
in a “remedy” regime (in the terminology of Dertwinkel-Kalt and Wey, 2016), which would thus
allow for approval conditional on the technology used by the integrated entity. In particular, a
merger should be approved by the antitrust authority only under the remedy that the integrated
entity uses the acquiree’s technology (rather than the acquirer’s technology).
In a similar vein, there may be mergers that enhance total surplus that use the acquirer’s
technology, whereas the antitrust authority would prefer a merger that uses the acquiree’s
technology. Here, too, our analysis suggests that these mergers should be approved with the
remedy that the integrated entity uses the acquiree’s technology. In fact, when the merger uses
the acquiree’s technology, total surplus is larger than when it uses the acquirer’s technology —
except if the R&D technology is extremely effective (γ < 1.645).
A note should be made regarding the antitrust authority’s welfare standard under consider-
ation. Assessing the welfare effects of a merger by the impact on total surplus might lead to the
approval of mergers in which the gains realized by producers exceed the losses experienced by
consumers. If instead the antitrust authority’s objective is to maximize consumer surplus, our
analysis reveals that a merger leads to an increase in consumer surplus only under complemen-
tary research paths and when the R&D technology is too effective, i.e., γ < γccs (β) < γ
c
w (β)
— see Figure 4. Here, too, market and consumer incentives for a merger are misaligned. For
instance, for γ > γccs (β) in the yellow Y
c region of Figure 4, a merger detrimental to consumers
is sustained by a CPNE, whereas non-integration cannot be sustained by a CPNE. By contrast,
for γ < γccs (β) in the blue B
c region of Figure 4, a merger is beneficial for consumers but
cannot be sustained by a CPNE. These findings provide clear guidance for policy intervention
in connection with horizontal mergers.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the role of firms’ cost-reducing R&D investments in endogenously
creating cost asymmetries and potential efficiency gains that render horizontal mergers prof-
itable. Three key features determine whether the equilibrium of an industry involves a merger:
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The effectiveness of the R&D technology, the extend to which firms R&D investments are com-
plementary, and the distribution of bargaining power, which determines the division of the
incremental profits generated by the merger. We identify the conditions under which mergers
of different types can be sustained by coalition-proof Nash equilibria. (The use of CPNE as a
solution concept, albeit natural, is novel in this literature.) Then, we study the welfare effects
of alternative mergers and suggest corrective policy measures.
We demonstrate that when firms’ R&D investments follow complementary research paths, a
merger is more likely to be viable than when they follow duplicative research paths. Moreover,
in the latter case, mergers in which the acquiree’s technology is used by the integrated entity
are more easily viable. Under duplicative research paths, the most and the least efficient firms
are more likely to merge. Such mergers may also arise under complementary research paths,
but only if the acquirer’s bargaining power is sufficiently large — when it is not, a merger is
likely to involve the two most efficient firms.
Regarding welfare implications, our analysis suggests that an antitrust authority using the
total surplus welfare standard should approve a merger only if the R&D technology is suf-
ficiently effective. Moreover, the criteria for approving a merger should be more stringent
under duplicative than under complementary research paths. When the objective of the policy
maker’s welfare standard is consumer surplus, our analysis suggests that mergers should only
be approved when firms follow complementary research paths and only if the R&D technology
is sufficiently effective.
We find that market and societal incentives for a merger are often misaligned. Thus, under
some circumstances policy-makers should encourage firms, e.g., via R&D subsidization policies,
toward mergers that otherwise would not materialize. Our analysis further advocates relatively
stringent approval criteria under duplicative research paths: In this case the antitrust authority
should approve a merger only under the remedy that the integrated entity uses the acquiree’s
technology.
We leave for future research the effect of introducing uncertainty over the efficiency gains of
R&D investments, which in turn makes the gains resulting from horizontal mergers uncertain —
see, e.g., Choné and Linnemer (2008), Zhou (2008), Amir et al. (2009), Hamada (2012). Incor-
porating uncertainty into our framework could lead to new insights on firms’ merger incentives
and the design of appropriate antitrust policies.
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8 Appendix
A.1. Outcome in a CPNE that sustains non-integration
In a CPNE that sustains non-integration, the firms’ levels of R&D, output and profits, and
the consumer surplus are given by
xNI =
3 (α− c)
8γ − 3
qNI =
2 (α− c) γ
8γ − 3
ΠNI =
γ (8γ − 9) (α− c)2
2 (8γ − 3)2
CSNI =
18γ2(α− c)2
(3− 8γ)2
. (23)
A.2. Duplicative research paths: Outcomes in a CPNE that sustains a merger
(A) In a CPNE that sustains a merger in which xa > xa, the firms’ levels of R&D, output
and profits, and the consumer surplus are given by
xa = D(4− 3γ)

4β2 + 32β − 27γ − 14βγ

xa = D(4− 3γ)

4β2 + 32β − 9γ − 18βγ

xo = 4D

4β2 + 32β + 24γ2 − 33γ − 26βγ

qo = 3γD

4β2 + 32β + 24γ2 − 33γ − 26βγ

Q = 12γD

2β2 − 10βγ + 12β + 6γ2 − 7γ − 2

Πa = γDaD
2
(4− 3γ)2
Πa = γDaD
2
(4− 3γ)2
Πo = γD
2
(9γ − 8)

4β2 + 48β + 48γ2 − 71γ − 38βγ + 8
2
CS
d
=
9
2
γ2D
2 
4β2 + 48β + 48γ2 − 71γ − 38βγ + 8
2
, (24)
where
D =
1
4
(α− c)
54γ3 − 6(17 + 8β)γ2 + (6β2 + 86β + 39)γ − 4β(8 + β)
Da = 36γ
3 (2β − 9) +
1
2
γ2 (27 + 14β)2 + 8β2 (8 + β)2 − 8βγ

8β2 + 73β + 72

Da = 36γ
3 (2β + 7)−
9
2
γ2 (1 + 2β) (73 + 18β)− 8β2 (8 + β)2 + 4γ

16β3 + 182β2 + 180β + 9

.
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(B) In a CPNE that sustains a merger in which xa < xa, the firms’ levels of R&D, output
and profits, and the consumer surplus are given by
xa = D(4− 3γ)

4β2 − 40β − 27γ + 18βγ + 36

xa = D(4− 3γ)

4β2 − 40β − 41γ + 14βγ + 36

xo = 4D

4β2 − 40β + 24γ2 − 59γ + 26βγ + 36

qo = 3γD

4β2 − 40β + 24γ2 − 59γ − 26βγ + 36

Q = 3γD

4β2 − 56β + 48γ2 − 109γ − 14βγ + 60

Πa = γDaD
2(4− 3γ)2
Πa = γDaD
2(4− 3γ)2
Πo = γD
2(9γ − 8)

4β2 − 40β + 24γ2 − 59γ + 26βγ + 36
2
CSd =
9
2
γ2D2

4β2 − 56β + 48γ2 − 109γ + 38βγ + 60

, (25)
where
D =
1
4
(α− c)
β2(6γ − 4) + β(48γ2 − 98γ + 40) + (3γ − 4) (18γ2 − 26γ + 9)
Da = 36(9− 2β)γ
3 −
9
2
γ2(273− 236β + 36β2)
−4γ(−387 + 592β − 230β2 + 16β3)− 8(β − 9)2(1− β)2
Da = 36(7 + 2β)γ
3 −
γ2
2
(41− 14β)2 − 8γ(−153 + 242β − 97β2 + 8β3)− 4(β − 9)2)(1− β)2.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(2.1.) Consider a profile (x,m) leading to a type 1 merger. In order for (x,m) to be a
NE, the profile of R&D investments x must satisfy xa = R¯a(xa, xo) > xa = Ra(xa, xo), and
xo = Ro(xa, xa) — see equations (15) to (19). As the outsider is on its reaction function, it does
not have an improving unilateral deviation from (x,m). Consider a unilateral deviation from
(x,m) by firm a¯ to m˜a¯ = (a¯, a¯) and x˜a¯ = R
(3)(xo + xa). Then Π
(3)
a¯ (xo + xa, x˜a¯) ≤ Πa(x,m)
if and only if γ ≤ γ¯1(β), with
dγ¯1
dβ
< 0, γ¯1(0.5) = 3.280 and γ¯1(1) = 2.744. Consider a
unilateral deviation from (x,m) by firm a to m˜a = (a, a) and x˜a = R
(3)(xo + xa). Then
Π
(3)
a (xo + xa, x˜a) ≤ Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ≤ γ¯2(β), with
dγ¯2
dβ
> 0, γ¯2(0.5) = 3.167 and
γ¯1(1) = 3.666. Therefore, unilateral deviations are not profitable, and thus the profile (x,m) is
a NE, if and only if γ ≤ γ¯12(β) := min{γ¯1(β), γ¯2(β)}.
(2.2) Consider a profile (x,m) leading to a type 2 merger. In order for (x,m) to be a NE,
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the profile of R&D investments x must satisfy xa = Ra(xa, xo) < xa = Ra(xa¯, xo), and xo =
Ro(xa, xa). Again, the outsider is on its reaction function and thus has no improving unilateral
deviation from (x,m). Consider a unilateral deviation from (x,m) of firm a¯ to m˜a¯ = (a¯, a¯) and
x˜a¯ = R
(3)(xo + xa). Then Π
(3)
a¯ (xo + xa, x˜a¯) ≤ Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ≤ γ1(β), with
dγ
1
dβ
< 0,
γ
1
(0.5) = 3.167 and γ
1
(1) = 2.759 . Consider now a unilateral deviation from (x,m) of firm
a to m˜a = (a, a) and x˜a = R
(3)(xo + xa). Then Π
(3)
a (xo + xa, x˜a) ≤ Πa(x,m) if and only if
γ ≤ γ
2
(β), with
dγ
2
dβ
> 0, γ
2
(0.5) = 3.280 and γ
2
(1) = 4.0. Thus, γ
1
(β) < γ
2
(β). Therefore,
unilateral deviations are not profitable and thus the profile (x,m) is a NE, if only if γ ≤ γ
1
(β).
Proof of Proposition 3: Using (23), (24) and (25), and after messy algebraic manipula-
tions, we obtain the results.12
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Non-integration is sustained by a NE for all parameter values. This is because there is no
profitable unilateral deviation, and there is no profitable self-enforcing deviation by all three
firms either. We now determine the conditions under which non-integration is sustained by a
CPNE. Let x = (xNI , xNI , xNI) andm = [(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)] be the non-integration equilibrium
strategy profile. Hence the deviations to consider are those involving a merger by any two firms,
i.e., a deviation by a coalition {a¯, a}, such that m˜a¯ = m˜a = (a¯, a) and some x˜a, x˜a ∈ [0, c]. Let
(x˜, m˜) the profile of firms’ R&D investments and merger proposals after the deviation. There
are two types of such deviations to consider:
(NI.1) x˜a = Ra(x˜a, x
NI) > x˜a = Ra(x˜a, x
NI). Simple algebra reveals that Πa(x˜, m˜) <
Πa(x,m), and therefore that this is not a profitable deviation.
(NI.2) x˜a = Ra(x˜a, x
NI) < x˜a = Ra(x˜a, x
NI). Then Πa¯(x˜, m˜) > Πa¯(x,m), while Πa(x˜, m˜) >
Πa(x,m) if and only if γ < γ(β), with
dγ
dβ
> 0, γ(1) = 2.278 and γ(β) = 0 for β = 0.719. Assume
that γ < γ(β), and consider a unilateral deviation by firm a¯ from (x˜, m˜) to mˆa¯ = (a¯, a¯) and
xˆa¯ = R(3)(xNI + x˜a). Then Π
(3)
a¯ (x
NI + x˜a, xˆa¯) < Πa(x˜, m˜), i.e., firm a¯ has no incentive to
unilaterally deviate from (x˜, m˜). Consider next a unilateral deviation by firm a from (x˜, m˜) to
mˆa = (a, a) and xˆa = R
(3)(xNI + x˜a). Then Π
(3)
a (xNI + x˜a, xˆa) < Πa(x˜, m˜), i.e., firm a has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from (x˜, m˜) either.
Thus, if γ ≥ γ(β), then a deviation of any two firms to form an integrated entity is non-
profitable, and therefore non-integration is sustained by a CPNE. However, if γ < γ(β), the
deviation described in NI.2 above is profitable and self-enforcing, and therefore in this case
non-integration cannot be sustained by a CPNE.
12These are available from the authors upon request.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2 and 4.3: Consider a profile (x,m) leading to a merger that
is sustained by a NE. Again, let a¯ = 1, a = 3 and o = 2, i.e., m = [(1, 3), (2, 2), (1, 3)]. We
study the conditions under which such a profile is a CPNE. For this we also need to consider
deviations of coalitions of two firms.
(M1) xa = R¯a(xa, xo) > xa = Ra(xa, xo).
By symmetry, deviations of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ and the acquiree a, in
which they interchange their roles and their levels of investment, are not profitable. Other
coalitional deviations to consider are as follows:
(M1.1) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (2, 3). Simple algebra
reveals that whether x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) > x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) or x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) < x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa),
the outsider’s profits following such a deviation are below those at (x,m), i.e., Π2(x˜, m˜) <
Πo(x,m), and therefore these deviations are not profitable.
(M1.2) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (3, 2). Simple algebra
reveals that whether x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) > x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) or x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) < x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa)
the outsider’s profits following such a deviation are below those at (x,m), i.e., Π2(x˜, m˜) <
Πo(x,m), and therefore these deviations are not profitable.
(M1.3) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (2, 1). Assume that
x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa) > x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa); again simple algebra reveals that Π1(x˜, m˜) < Πa¯(x,m),
and therefore this deviation is not profitable. Assume instead that x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa) < x˜1 =
Ra(x˜2, xa). Then Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) if and only if γ < γ¯3(β), with
dγ¯3
dβ
> 0, γ¯3(1) = 1.710
and γ¯3(β) = 0 for β = 0.621; and Π1(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) if and only if γ > γ¯4(β), with
dγ¯4
dβ
> 0,
γ¯4(1) = 1.702 and γ¯4(β) = 0 for β = 0.698. Thus, Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) and Π1(x˜, m˜) >
Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ∈ (γ¯4(β), γ¯3(β)), with γ¯3(β) < γ¯12(β). Assume γ ∈ (γ¯4(β), γ¯3(β)); a
further unilateral deviation of firm 1 from (x˜, m˜) to mˆ1 = (1, 1) and xˆ1 = R
(3)(x˜2 + xa) leads
to profits Π
(3)
1 (x˜2 + xa, xˆ1) < Π1(x˜, m˜); likewise, a further unilateral deviation of firm 2 from
(x˜, m˜) to mˆ2 = (2, 2) and xˆ2 = R
(3)(x˜1+xa) leads to profits Π
(3)
2 (x˜1+xa, xˆ2) < Π2(x˜, m˜). Thus,
for γ ∈ (γ¯4(β), γ¯3(β)) this coalitional deviation is self-enforcing and improving, and therefore a
merger cannot be sustained by a CPNE.
(M1.4) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (1, 2). Assume that
x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa) > x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa); again simple algebra reveals that Π2(x˜, m˜) < Πo(x,m),
and therefore this deviation is not profitable. Assume instead that x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa) < x˜2 =
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Ra(x˜1, xa); then Π1(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) if and only if γ > γ¯5(β), with
dγ¯5
dβ
< 0 and γ¯5(1) = 2.985;
and Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) if and only if γ < γ¯6(β), with
dγ¯6
dβ
> 0, γ¯6(0.5) = 1.947 and γ¯6(1) =
2.091. However, γ¯5(β) > γ¯6(β) and hence, the region of the parameter space on which both
these inequalities hold is empty; therefore, this coalitional deviation is not profitable.
(M1.5) A deviation of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ = 1 and the acquiree a = 3
maintaining their roles in the merger, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (1, 3), but altering their R&D investments
to x˜1 = Ra(x˜3, xo) < x˜3 = Ra(x˜1, xo). Then Π1(x˜, m˜) < Πa(x,m) (see Proposition 3.6), and
therefore this coalitional deviation is not profitable.
(M1.6) A deviation of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ = 1 and the acquiree a = 3,
interchanging their roles in the merger, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (3, 1), and adjusting their R&D
investments to x˜1 = Ra(x˜3, xo) > x˜3 = Ra(x˜1, xo); then Π3(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) always; while
Π1(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) if and only if γ > γ¯7(β), with
dγ¯7
dβ
< 0, γ¯7(0.5) = 2.125 and γ¯7(1) = 2.119.
Thus, γ¯7(β) < γ¯12(β). Assume that γ > γ¯7(β); a further unilateral deviation of firm 1 from
(x˜, m˜) to mˆ1 = (1, 1) and xˆ1 = R(3)(xo+ x˜3) leads to profits Π
(3)
1 (xo+ x˜3, xˆ1) > Π1(x˜, m˜) if and
only if γ > γ¯8(β), with
dγ¯8
dβ
> 0 and γ¯8(0.5) = 3.280; likewise, a further unilateral deviation of
firm 3 from (x˜, m˜) to mˆ3 = (3, 3) and xˆ3 = R
(3)(xo + x˜1) leads to profits Π
(3)
3 (xo + x˜1, xˆ3) >
Π3(x˜, m˜) if and only if γ > γ¯9(β), with
dγ¯9
dβ
< 0 and γ¯9(.5) = 3.166. Hence, γ¯8(β) > γ¯9(β) and
hence, for γ ∈ (γ¯7(β), γ¯9(β)) the deviation (x˜, m˜) from (x,m) is self-enforcing and profitable for
the coalition, and thus, (x,m) cannot be sustained by a CPNE.
Finally, it is easy to see that if (x,m) is invulnerable to unilateral deviations and to deviations
of coalitions of two firms, then it is also invulnerable to deviations of the grant coalition. Note
that self-enforcing deviations must be NE since otherwise they are vulnerable to deviations
of individual firms, which are self-enforcing. A deviation of the grant coalition that leads to
non-integration is not improving because by Proposition 3.5, the profit of the outsider is below
its profit when there is a merger. Conversely, deviations of the grant coalition that leads to a
merger can be implemented by a deviation of a coalition of two firms, which we have already
considered.
By Proposition 2 and the above discussion, we conclude that a type 1 merger in which the
R&D investments satisfy xa = R¯a(xa, xo) > xa = Ra(xa, xo) can be sustained by a CPNE for
all (β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [3/2,∞) such that
γ ∈ [3/2, γ¯12(β)}]\{(γ¯4(β), γ¯3(β)) ∪ (γ¯7(β), γ¯9(β))}.
(M2) xa = Ra(xa, xo) < xa = Ra(xa¯, xo).
By symmetry, a deviation of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ and the acquiree a,
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in which they interchange their roles and their levels of investment, is not profitable. Other
coalitional deviations to consider are as follows:
(M2.1) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (2, 3). Simple algebra
reveals that Π3(x˜, m˜) < Πa(x,m) whenever x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) > x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa), and Π2(x˜, m˜) <
Πo(x,m) whenever x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) < x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa), and therefore these deviations are not
profitable.
(M2.2) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3
to form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (3, 2). Simple
algebra reveals that if x˜3 = R¯a(x˜2, xa) > x˜2 = R¯a(x˜3, xa), then Π2(x˜, m˜) < Πo(x,m), and
therefore this deviation is not profitable. If instead x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) < x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa), then
Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) if and only if γ < γ3(β), with
dγ
3
dβ
< 0, γ
3
(0.5) = 1.947 and γ
3
(1) = 1.662;
and Π3(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) if and only if γ > γ4(β), with γ4(β) = 0 for β = 0.914,
dγ
4
dβ
< 0
for β > 0.81 and γ
4
(β) = γ
3
(β) for β = 0.815. Hence, Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) and Π3(x˜, m˜) >
Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ∈ (γ4(β), γ3(β)), with γ3(β) < γ1(β). Assume that γ ∈ (γ4(β), γ3(β));
a further unilateral deviation of firm 2 from (x˜, m˜) to mˆ2 = (2, 2) and xˆ2 = R
(3)(xa+ x˜3) leads
to profits Π
(3)
2 (xa+ x˜3, xˆ2) < Π2(x˜, m˜), while a further unilateral deviation of firm 3 from (x˜, m˜)
to mˆ3 = (3, 3) and xˆ3 = R(3)(xa + x˜2) leads to profits Π
(3)
3 (xa + x˜2, xˆ3) < Π3(x˜, m˜). Hence
for γ ∈ (γ
3
(β), γ
4
(β)) the deviation (x˜, m˜) from (x,m) is self-enforcing and profitable for the
coalition, and thus, (x,m) can not be sustained by a CPNE.
(M2.3) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (2, 1). Simple algebra
reveals that whether x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) > x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) or x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) < x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa)
the outsider’s profits following a deviation are below those at (x,m), i.e., Π2(x˜, m˜) < Πo(x,m),
and therefore these deviations are not profitable.
(M2.4) Deviations of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (1, 2). Simple algebra
reveals that whether x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa) > x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa) or x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa) < x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa)
the outsider’s profits following a deviation are below those at (x,m), i.e., Π2(x˜, m˜) < Πo(x,m),
and therefore these deviations are not profitable.
(M2.5) A deviation of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ = 1 and the acquiree a =
3 maintaining their roles in the merger, i.e., m˜1 = m˜3 = (1, 3), but changing their R&D
investments to x˜1 = R¯a(x˜3, xo) > x˜3 = R¯a(x˜1, xo). Then Π3(x˜, m˜) < Πa(x,m) (see Proposition
3.6), and therefore this is not a profitable deviation.
(M2.6) A deviation of the coalition formed by the acquirer a¯ = 1 and the acquiree a = 3,
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interchanging their roles in the merger, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (3, 1), and adjusting their R&D
investments to x˜3 = R¯a(x˜1, xo) > x˜1 = R¯a(x˜3, xo). Simple algebra reveals that Π1(x˜, m˜) <
Πa¯(x,m), and therefore this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, it is easy to see that if (x,m) is invulnerable to unilateral deviations and to deviations
of coalitions of two firms, then it is also invulnerable to deviations of the grant coalition. Note
that self-enforcing deviations must be NE as otherwise they are vulnerable to deviations of
individual firms, which are self-enforcing. A deviation of the grant coalition that leads to non-
integration is not improving as by Proposition 3.6, the profit of the outsider is below its profit
when there is a merger. Conversely, deviations of the grant coalition that lead to a merger can
be implemented by a deviation of a coalition of two firms, which we have already considered.
By Lemma 1 and the above discussion, we conclude that the type 2 merger in which R&D
investments satisfy xa = Ra(xa, xo) < xa = Ra(xa¯, xo) can be sustained by a CPNE for all
(β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [3/2,∞) such that
γ ∈ [3/2, γ
1
(β)]\(γ
4
(β), γ
3
(β)).
Proof of Proposition 4.4: By Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 for (β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [3/2,∞)
such that
γ ∈ [(γ4(β), γ3(β))∩(γ4(β), γ3(β))]
a CPNE does not exist.
A.3. Complementary research paths: Outcomes in a CPNE that sustains a
merger
In a CPNE that sustains a merger, the firms’ levels of R&D, output and profits, and the
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consumer surplus are given by
xa¯ = E(4− 3γ)

28β2 − 52β − 27γ − 14βγ + 36

xo = 16E

20β2 − 20β + 6γ2 − 17γ + 12

xa = E(4− 3γ)

−28β2 + 41γ + 4β − 14βγ − 12

Q = 12E[β(1− β) (8− 26γ) + γ (3− 4γ) (4− 3γ)]
qo = 12Eγ[20β(1− β)− γ(17− 6γ) + 12]
Πa = E
2Ea(4− 3γ)
2
Πa = E
2Ea(4− 3γ)
2
Πo = 16E
2γ(9γ − 8) [−20β (1− β) + (2γ − 3) (3γ − 4)]2
CSc = 9E

12γ3 − 25γ2 + 26βγ(β − 1) + 12γ + 8β − 8β2
2
(26)
where
E =
1
8
(α− c)
γ2 (27γ − 75) + γ(70 + 69β − 69β2) + 52β(1− β)− 24
2Ea = γ
4(144β + 648) + γ3(196β2 + 2700β − 2457)
−8γ2(288β3 − 730β2 + 850β − 387)
−γ(784β4 + 3232β3 − 4496β2 + 1632β + 144)
+2944β5 − 6784β4 + 7040β3 − 4352β2 + 1152β
2Ea = γ
4(144β + 504)− γ3(196β2 + 2308β − 47)
+γ2(2304β3 − 1072β2 + 2032β − 168)
−(784β4 + 3232β3 − 4496β2 + 1632β + 144)γ
+2944β5 − 6784β4 + 7040β3 − 4352β2 + 1152β.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider a profile (x,m) that leads to a merger, and without loss of generality let a¯ = 1,
a = 3 and o = 2, i.e., m = [(1, 3), (2, 2), (1, 3)]. We study the conditions under which such a
profile is a NE. In a candidate NE, the profile of R&D investments x must satisfy the system
of equations (20) to (22). Let (x˜, m˜) be the profile of firms’ R&D investments after a unilateral
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deviation.
As the outsider is on its reaction function, it does not have an improving unilateral deviation
from (x,m). Consider a unilateral deviation from (x,m) by firm a¯ to m˜a¯ = (a¯, a¯) and x˜a¯ =
R(3)(xo + xa). Then Π
(3)
a¯ (xo + xa, x˜a¯) ≤ Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ≤ γ
c
1(β), with
dγc
1
dβ
< 0,
γc1(0.5) = 15.103 and γ
c
1(1) = 14.019. Consider a unilateral deviation from (x,m) by firm a to
m˜a = (a, a) and x˜a = R
(3)(xo+xa). Then Π
(3)
a (xo+xa, x˜a) ≤ Πa(x,m) if and only if γ ≤ γ
c
0(β),
with
dγc
0
dβ
> 0, γc0(0.5) = 15.103 and γ
c
0(1) = 15.659. As γ
c
1(β) ≤ γ
c
0(β), unilateral deviations are
not profitable whenever γ ≤ γc1(β), and thus the merger profile (x,m) is sustained by a NE.
Proof of Proposition 6: Using (23) and (26), and after messy algebraic manipulations,
we get the results.13
Proof of Proposition 7.1
Non-integration is sustained by a NE for all parameter values. This is because there is no
profitable unilateral deviation, and there is no profitable self-enforcing deviation by all three
firms either. We now determine the conditions under which non-integration is sustained by a
CPNE. Let x = (xNI , xNI , xNI) andm = [(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)] be the non-integration equilibrium
strategy profile. Hence the deviations to consider are those involving a merger by any two firms,
i.e., a deviation by a coalition {a¯, a}, such that m˜a¯ = m˜a = (a¯, a) and some x˜a, x˜a ∈ [0, c]. Let
(x˜, m˜) the profile of firms’ R&D investments and merger proposals after the deviation.
Let x˜a = Ra(x˜a, xNI) and x˜a = Ra(x˜a, xNI). Then Πa¯(x˜, m˜) > Πa¯(x,m) if and only if
γ < γc5(β), with
dγc
5
dβ
> 0, γc5(0.5) = 13.084 and γ
c
5(1) = 14.076; and Πa(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m) if and
only if γ < γc2(β), with
dγc
2
dβ
< 0, γc2(0.5) = 13.084, and γ
c
2(β) = 0 for β = 0.829. Thus, γ
c
2(β) <
γc5(β). Assume that γ < γ
c
2(β), and consider a unilateral deviation by firm a¯ from (x˜, m˜) to
mˆa¯ = (a¯, a¯) and xˆa¯ = R(3)(xNI + x˜a). Then Π
(3)
a¯ (x
NI + x˜a, xˆa¯) < Πa(x˜, m˜), i.e., firm a¯ has
no incentive to unilaterally deviate from (x˜, m˜). Consider next a unilateral deviation by firm a
from (x˜, m˜) to mˆa = (a, a) and xˆa = R
(3)(xNI + x˜a). Then Π
(3)
a (xNI + x˜a, xˆa) < Πa(x˜, m˜), i.e.,
firm a has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from (x˜, m˜) either.
Thus, if γ ≥ γc2(β), then a deviation of any two firms to form an integrated entity is non-
profitable, and therefore non-integration is sustained by a CPNE.
Proof of Proposition 7.2
Consider a profile (x,m) leading to a merger that is sustained by a NE. Again, let a¯ = 1,
a = 3 and o = 2, i.e., m = [(1, 3), (2, 2), (1, 3)]. We study the conditions under which such a
profile is a CPNE. For this we also need to consider deviations of coalitions of two firms.
13These are available from the authors upon request.
34
(M1.1) A deviation of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (2, 3). Simple algebra
reveals that whenever x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa) and x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa), the outsider’s profits following such
a deviation are below those at (x,m), i.e., Π2(x˜, m˜) < Πo(x,m), and therefore this deviation is
not profitable.
(M1.2) A deviation of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquiree a = 3 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜2 = m˜3 = (3, 2). Simple algebra
reveals that whenever x˜3 = Ra(x˜2, xa) and x˜2 = Ra(x˜3, xa), Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) if and only if
γ < γc3(β), with
dγc
3
dβ
< 0, γc3(0.5) = 4.245 and γ
c
3(β) = 0 for β = 0.844; and Π3(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m)
if and only if γ > γc4(β), with γ
c
4(β) = 0 for β = 0.760,
dγc
4
dβ
< 0 for β > 0.56 and γc4(β) = γ
c
3(β)
for β = 0.603. Assume γ ∈ (γc4(β), γ
c
3(β)); a further unilateral deviation of firm 3 from (x˜, m˜)
to mˆ3 = (3, 3) and xˆ3 = R
(3)(x˜2 + xa) leads to profits Π
(3)
1 (x˜2 + xa, xˆ3) < Π1(x˜, m˜); likewise, a
further unilateral deviation of firm 2 from (x˜, m˜) to mˆ2 = (2, 2) and xˆ2 = R
(3)(x˜3 + xa) leads
to profits Π
(3)
2 (x˜3 + xa, xˆ2) < Π2(x˜, m˜). Thus, for γ ∈ (γ
c
4(β), γ
c
3(β)) this coalitional deviation
is self-enforcing and improving, and therefore a merger cannot be sustained by a CPNE.
(M1.3) A deviation of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquirer, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (2, 1). Again simple
algebra reveals that whenever x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa) and x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa), then Π1(x˜, m˜) < Πa¯(x,m),
and therefore this deviation is not profitable.
(M1.4) A deviation of the coalition formed by the outsider o = 2 and the acquirer a¯ = 1 to
form a new merger in which the outsider is the acquiree, i.e., m˜1 = m˜2 = (1, 2). Simple algebra
reveals that whenever x˜1 = Ra(x˜2, xa) and x˜2 = Ra(x˜1, xa), then Π2(x˜, m˜) > Πo(x,m) if and
only if γ < γc6(β), with
dγc
6
dβ
> 0, γc6(0.5) = 4.245 and γ
c
6(1) = 5.564; and Π1(x˜, m˜) > Πa(x,m)
if and only if γ > γc7(β), with
dγc
7
dβ
< 0 and γc7(1) = 15.495. Since γ
c
6(β) < γ
c
7(β), this deviation
is never profitable for both firms.
Finally, it is easy to see that if (x,m) is invulnerable to unilateral deviations and to deviations
of coalitions of two firms, then it is also invulnerable to deviations of the grant coalition. Note
that self-enforcing deviations must be NE as otherwise they are vulnerable to deviations of
individual firms, which are self-enforcing. A deviation of the grant coalition that leads to non-
integration is not improving as by Proposition 6.4, the firms have conflicting interests regarding
a merger. Conversely, deviations of the grant coalition that lead to a merger can be implemented
by a deviation of a coalition of two firms, which we have already considered.
By Proposition 4 and the above discussion, we conclude that a merger can be sustained by
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a CPNE for all (β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [5/2,∞) such that
γ ∈ [5/2, γc1(β)]\(γ
c
4(β), γ
c
3(β)).
Proof of Proposition 7.3: By Propositions 7.1 and 7.2 for all (β, γ) ∈ [1/2, 1]× [5/2,∞)
such that γ ∈ (γc4(β), γ
c
3(β)) a CPNE does not exist.
A.4: Proof of Proposition 8
(8.1) Using (23) and (24), we can check that S¯d(β, γ) = CS
d
+Πa+Πa+Πo ≥ S
NI(β, γ) =
CSNI+3ΠNI if and only if γ ≤ γ¯dw(β), with
dγ¯dw
dβ
< 0, γ¯dw(0.5) = 2.259 and γ¯
d
w(1) = 1.915. Using
(23) and (25), we can check that Sd(β, γ) = CSd+Πa+Πa+Πo ≥ S
NI(β, γ) = CSNI +3ΠNI
if and only if γ ≤ γd
w
(β), with
dγd
w
dβ
> 0, γd
w
(0.5) = 2.259 and γd
w
(1) = 2.726. Moreover,
γd
w
(β) ≥ γ¯dw(β), and therefore the last statement immediately follows. Finally, we can checked
that CSd < CS
d
< CSNI always.
(8.2) Using (23) and (26), we can check that Sc(β, γ) = CSc+Πa+Πa+Πo ≥ S
NI(β, γ) =
CSNI + 3ΠNI if and only if γ ≤ γcw(β), with
dγcw
dβ
< 0, γcw(0.5) = 8.157 and γ
c
w(1) = 7.425.
Moreover, CSc > CSNI if and only if γ ≤ γccs(β), with
dγccs
dβ
< 0, γccs(0.5) = 3.359 and γ
c
cs(1) =
2.5.
(8.3) As γcw(β) > γ
d
w
(β) , the statement immediately follows.
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Figure 1: Type 1 (type 2) mergers are sustained by a NE below the black (red) line.
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Figure 2a: Non-integration is sustained by a CPNE in the blue region Bd.
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Figure 3: Outcomes sustained by CPNE under duplicative research paths: non-integation
(areas in blue, purple, green and grey), type 1 mergers (areas in purple, grey, orange and red),
type 2 mergers (areas in green, grey, yellow and orange).
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Figure 4: Outcomes sustained by CPNE under complementary research paths: non-integation
(blue region Bc), mergers (yellow region Y c), non-integration and mergers (green region Gc),
no CPNE exists (white region W c).
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